1	STATE OF WISCONSIN		DANE COUNTY
2		Branch 8	
3	LEONARD POZNER,		
4	LEONARD FORNER,		
5		Plaintiff,	OTT 2100
6	VS.	Case No. 18	CV 3122
7	JAMES FETZER, et al		
8		Defendants.	
9			
10	(PROCEEDINGS	WERE HELD VIA ZOOM VIDEO CONFE	RENCE)
11	DATE:	June 24, 2022	
12	DEEODE.		ON
13	BEFORE:	The Honorable FRANK D. REMINGTON	
14	PROCEEDINGS:	Oral Arguments	
15	A DDEADANGEG	RANDY J. PFLUM, Attorney at Law, Quarles & Brady, Madison, Wisconsin, and JACOB S. ZIMMERMAN, Attorney at Law, The Zimmerman Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota, appeared on	
16	APPEARANCES:		and JACOB S.
17			
18		behalf of the Plaintiff.	
19		JENNIFER M. SCHANK, Attorney a Fuhrman & Dodge, S.C., Middlet	con,
20		Wisconsin, appeared on behalf the Defendant.	of
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24			
25		ANN M. ALBERT, RMR, CRR Court Reporter	

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE COURT: Good morning. This is 18 CV 3122,
3	Leonard Pozner versus James Fetzer. May I have the
4	appearances, please.
5	MR. PFLUM: Attorney Randy J. Pflum appears on
6	behalf of the plaintiff, Leonard Pozner. And with me
7	appearing as co-counsel is Attorney Jacob Zimmerman.
8	THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome. For the
9	defense?
10	MS. SCHANK: Good morning, your Honor.
11	Attorney Jennifer Schank of Fuhrman & Dodge, S.C. appears
12	on behalf of Dr. James Fetzer for the limited purpose of
13	this motion. Also present via this Zoom is Dr. James
14	Fetzer, who has identified himself and is at a separate
15	location, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Welcome.
17	So we're on the Court's calendar because the
18	plaintiff filed what it calls a Motion for Turnover of
19	Property to Apply Property to Satisfy the Judgment.
20	I have been benefited by the briefs filed by
21	the parties. I've studied those briefs. I do have a
22	couple of questions, and then I intend to rule on the
23	motion from the bench.
24	Let's start with Mr. Pflum. I usually in all
25	my cases where I have an oral argument begin by just

asking you, is there any more that you would like to add in support of your motion that's not repetitive to what you wrote?

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MR. PFLUM: Your Honor, at this time I have nothing further to add. And I would be happy to address any -- Attorney Zimmerman and I would be happy to address any questions from the Court.

THE COURT: All right. I do have a question.

I know Ms. Schank has raised some questions about the ability to what I'll call attach this property.

It seems to me there are three questions before the Court this morning. One, whether this kind of property can be attached and used to satisfy part of a judgment. Two -- and that's a legal question, by the way.

Two, the second question is if it can, factually, is this Mr. -- is this Professor Fetzer's property?

And then three, if it can be attached and if it is his property, what amount does the plaintiff suggest should be set off against the monetary judgment against the defendant?

So let's set aside the first question, the question of law, because I believe that was briefed thoroughly by the parties.

The second question I can set aside for now. I do have a couple questions on Dr. Fetzer's ownership interest in the property. But the third question is is, Mr. Pflum, you don't really tell me how much the property is worth in the plaintiff's opinion and what credit will he give in satisfaction or personal satisfaction of the judgment.

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MR. PFLUM: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Fetzer testified during his supplemental exam that in 2019 -and I apologize if this is not laid out clearly in the briefing, but Dr. Fetzer did testify in 2019 that Wrongs Without Wremedies sold off part of the stock of "Nobody Died at Sandy Hook," and he received approximately \$25,000 in royalties. It follows that the remaining editions from the plaintiff's perspective that Dr. Fetzer holds the copyright to those, those editions are also worth an amount not less than \$25,000 as well. And if the Court agrees with us on the remaining questions about whether this is property, this is the type of property that can be applied and turned over, whether Mr. Fetzer does have -- this is actually his property, we would argue or we would offset the judgment by \$25,000 per edition. That's our position.

THE COURT: Refresh my recollection how many editions are there.

1 MR. PFLUM: I believe there's four, so in grand 2 total, we would contend that \$25,000 per edition would 3 offset the judgment \$100,000.

THE COURT: All right. So Ms. Schank, working our way backward, we now know how much it's worth. Your client, Professor Fetzer, it was slightly ambiguous, and I want to follow up, but let's say he takes the position that, as he has in part, that none of these things are worth anything, a combination of they're not worth anything because they're not being published, they can't be published, or they say they're not worth anything to him because he doesn't even own 'em.

So if we assume that they are in Dr. Fetzer's position worthless in terms of a monetary value, and if they have no value to him because they are not being published, can't be published, or not owned by him, why wouldn't he say they want to credit me \$100,000, I'm okay with that?

Would you like to go in a breakout room with your client?

MS. SCHANK: Um, sure, your Honor, because the \$25,000 setoff is a new --- something new that we didn't know or discuss, so that would be -- if we could have that opportunity, we could be pretty quick and --

THE COURT: All right. So let me raise the

second point that I'd like you to discuss with your client. And I'm gonna sort of trickle out my current thoughts.

I do agree with the plaintiff that this is the kind of property that can be attached. The complications that have been raised by Dr. Fetzer over his ownership interest, it occurred to me, could they not be considered as follows. So Dr. Fetzer says, without reciting back this particular aspect of each individual item of property, he says I don't own that, let's say their domain name. Somebody else does. You can buy it. It's not mine.

In real estate, Ms. Schank, which I think maybe you also have some experience, it's not uncommon when you have a party that it's not clear what any and all ownership interest is in the property, then they say, well, look at, I don't know what it is, but I'll give you a quitclaim deed. Whatever I have -- oh, by the way, I don't think I have anything, but if I do have anything, I'm assigning my interest, whatever it is, to you. And if it is worth -- if it's no interest, let caveat emptor. If it's something, well, okay, good luck to you. That's your problem to deal with, whatever you want to do. I don't know what I'm assigning to you. But whatever I have, it's yours.

Why not take that approach? At least what I'd like to have you talk to Dr. Fetzer is of the items of property that the plaintiff seeks to attach, I would assume some things like the domain name that he says he doesn't own, that he says, well, okay, I'll give an assignment of all my right, title and interest in it because I don't own anything, it's not worth fighting over, if that's what his position is.

So what I thought is, at least in terms of where I was thinking as a resolution of the issue is now that you know the monetary value of by the plaintiff what is sought, does Dr. Fetzer agree or disagree that it is of that much more? Or I assume if he thinks it's worth less, you don't need to say anything. If you think it's worth more, and then why worry about the quality of the rights being transferred because that can be just the plaintiff's problem. That's the question I'm gonna be asking you after you get out of your breakout room. Let me see if I can do that right now.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  FETZER: Jennifer, I'm good to address these issues.

MS. SCHANK: We're gonna go into a breakout room, Dr. Fetzer. So you see on your screen the pop-up where it says "Find Room 1?" If you can click "Find."

Oh, it looks like you already did.

- 1 THE COURT: Yeah. There you go.
- Just before you go, Ms. Schank, please tell him
- 3 that -- never mind. I'm just going to mute and stop
- 4 video. We'll watch to see when they come back, Mr.
- 5 Pflum.
- 6 MR. PFLUM: Thank you, your Honor.
- 7 (Recess)
- 8 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go back on the record.
- 9 Ms. Schank.
- 10 MS. SCHANK: Your Honor, after conferring with
- my client, we respectfully decline any I'm not sure what
- we want to call it, but \$100,000 credit, essentially,
- against the judgment as a means to resolve today's
- motion.
- I have some responses to some of the questions
- that the Court has posed. First, regarding ownership, I
- 17 think that is a very determinative factor as to why Dr.
- 18 Fetzer believes that he cannot even, you know, he cannot
- 19 -- he is not the owner of the books. He has testified to
- that. Therefore, he cannot turn them over. I don't
- 21 think that --
- THE COURT: But Ms. Schank, I think it's really
- important to use specific language to address this
- particular factual scenario, and I'm sorry to interrupt
- you, but I'm not suggesting that he, let's say, perjures

himself or force him into saying an untruth that "I own the books and I'll give you my ownership interest."

Let's assume from the point of departure the accuracy of the statements he made in your brief that he has no ownership interest. The question then would be is notwithstanding, should I nonetheless by court order transfer to the plaintiff whatever interest Dr. Fetzer has in these assets ranging from sole ownership or no ownership? And my question to you is, let's assuming he does not own them at all, there's no interest in it, I assume Mr. Pflum will continue to say we understand that, your Honor, and we'll take that risk on ourselves. If we essentially buy nothing, it's worth \$100,000 spent. No returns allowed. They go into this transaction with open eyes.

So I interrupted you by saying I don't think the question is asking Dr. Fetzer to acknowledge an ownership interest. He can say he doesn't have any interest in it. My question is should I nonetheless transfer any possible right, title and interest that he may have over to the plaintiff for the plaintiff to worry about?

MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. And to try to respond to that a little more direct, I apologize for not being clear, but I think the issue with that is that the

plaintiff in his reply brief notes that there are 13 authors of the content. It seems to be not really in the spirit of Wisconsin collection laws and also creates sort of a slippery slope to have a court order saying, you know, here, plaintiff, judgment creditor, essentially, have at it as to figuring out who owners are, and I'm gonna grant your motion for turnover as to Dr. Fetzer's potential assets, when the plaintiff really hasn't even shown who owns those assets.

So to me, that is a very confusing concept that doesn't really comply with the spirit of what Wisconsin Statute chapters 815 and 816 stand for to turn over property to satisfy a judgment, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me give you a hypothetical, Ms. Schank. Let's say, Ms. Schank, you and three of your college friends bought a cabin in northern Wisconsin.

Let's say it's titled in College Friends Partnership, and the members of the partners are you and your three friends. Let's say then you have a judgment taken against you, and the creditor wants your assets and understands you have a one-quarter interest in this million-dollar cottage in northern Wisconsin.

Are you saying to me then that this asset, a quarter of which you own, is untouchable because of the fact that you happen to own it with three other people?

1 MS. SCHANK: No, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Well, isn't that the situation 3 here? I want to make clear, and I think Mr. Pflum will correct me if I'm wrong, nothing that's being asked of 4 the Court today and nothing I do here will affect any 5 ownership rights of any other person than Dr. Fetzer. 6 7 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, can I an address 8 that? This is Jake Zimmerman. 9 THE COURT: Okay. 10 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Just because I have some 11 additional familiarity with intellectual property. 12 You're exactly right, your Honor. Federal law 17 U.S.C. 13 section 201 defines the ownership of a collective work. 14 And there are multiple levels of copyright that arise in a collective work such as this one where there are 13 15 16 authors. Section 201(c) says the copyright in each individual chapter resides with the author of that 17 18 chapter, but the copyright to the work as a whole, to the 19 collective work, resides in the person who compiled the 20 collective work, in this case, Dr. Fetzer. 2.1 Does that answer the Court's question? 22 THE COURT: It does. Ms. Schank, your response? 23 24 MS. SCHANK: If I may first go back quickly to

the hypothetical that you provided me to just kind of

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- expand why I answered the way I did quickly is that I

  think that the difference there would be step one of

  proving the ownership. I hypothetically assume that

  under that scenario, my name would be on a title or on

  some kind of operating agreement for the LLC that owns

  the property. So I believe we're still skipping the step

  one ownership proof.
- 8 THE COURT: Okay. Okay. But if that's what 9 you want me to do, then that's fine.
- Mr. Pflum, I read with some care your brief.

  You chose a discreet set of assets that you want to be turned over to the plaintiff; right?
- MR. PFLUM: Yes. Yes, your Honor.
- THE COURT: And the plaintiff is suggesting
  there is a factual basis to support the assertion that
  Dr. Fetzer has an ownership interest in these assets;
  correct?
- MR. PFLUM: Yes, your Honor. Correct.

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- THE COURT: Now, I understand Dr. Fetzer has
  waffled, so to speak, testifying to one thing in his
  deposition and another in his affidavit. The sham
  affidavit rule is lurking about here. But I'll address
  that, Ms. Schank, by a specific question to Mr. Pflum.
  - Mr. Pflum, are you asking me to turn over any asset that you know Dr. Fetzer has no interest in?

1 MR. PFLUM: No. We are only seeking assets
2 that Dr. Fetzer has an interest in by his -- by his means
3 of organizing the -- by organizing the collective work as
4 Attorney Zimmerman just described.

THE COURT: And you believe that in your motion and supporting documents, you have made a factual basis to support that statement?

MR. PFLUM: Yes, your Honor, because we believe that by Dr. Fetzer distributing, being able to distribute the works and by operation of copyright law that Dr. Fetzer has the ownership interest in the copyright and with the ability and the right to distribute those works. Whether that's written down on a piece of paper somewhere, we have not seen that. However, by our review of copyright law, his ownership interest arose through —by operation of law.

THE COURT: So Mr. Pflum, last question for you. If I understand the plaintiff's argument as to ownership, it's really a mixed question of fact and law. The facts have been adduced during the deposition of James Fetzer and in this case over his own statements as to his participation, his creation, his authorship, his editorializing these documents, also his deposition testimony, also his belief at that time over his ownership or rights or entitlement to this property, plus

an application of law to those basic facts of the

copyright law which then, therefore, creates a conclusion

of one way or the other Dr. Fetzer's ownership of this

property. Am I correct understanding the plaintiff's

argument?

6 MR. PFLUM: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Ms. Schank, back to you. I think that I've addressed the ownership interest. I do conclude that the plaintiff has satisfied me as to that mixed question of fact and law that Dr. Fetzer has an ownership interest in the property that's being sought. How much so I don't think can under the copyright law be quantified at this point nor need be quantified in order to grant the motion for the attachment to turn over the property.

Ms. Schank?

MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. I'd like to just point out a couple other things now that the Court has made a determination on the ownership.

We argue that there is no value in any of these assets and, therefore, you know, even if there's some nominal value, that value would be exempt under statutes.

THE COURT: So we'll talk about the exemption later, but Ms. Schank, Ms. Schank -- hang on, Dr. Fetzer.

Ms. Schank, I'm kind of loath to accept your argument

with the plaintiff that it has the legal authority to seize the assets. I know it's sort of a -- it's more than just a technical decision. But I'm sure it would be a worse outcome for your client to lose the property and be credited nothing than it would be to lose the property and see a \$100,000 reduction on the judgment.

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How do you propose to delicately balance? Are you gonna put all your eggs in the basket of saying,

Judge, do what you need to do, but I want you to find the property has no value?

MS. SCHANK: No, your Honor. But I guess, you know, we feel that it's still relevant and important to point out this Court's order from December of 2019 which prohibited Dr. Fetzer from making certain statements.

Those statements are contained in the books. And so it's difficult to understand how the plaintiff would either wish to or how these books could be distributed.

I believe Attorney Pflum today stated that he believes that Dr. Fetzer could have distributed the books. But that's not entirely accurate. I believe under that court order of this Court, it would -- he would be prohibited from that specific content of statements.

THE COURT: But Ms. Schank, you're backing me

- into a corner, so to speak. If I agree with your

  argument or the analysis which you apply, then I must

  come to the conclusion as a finding of facts that these

  assets have no monetary value.
- MS. SCHANK: Your Honor, in response to that, I
  think this may be a set of circumstances where
  appointment of a receiver would be appropriate to
  untangle some of the valuation and specifics of the
  property behind this and other owners, given the
  circumstances.
- Jim, just -- put yourself on mute, Jim, 'cause

  I'm catching your background a little bit, please.
- MR. FETZER: Well, I would like to speak,

  Jennifer.

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- THE COURT: Well, Dr. Fetzer, some things just don't change. It is the standard court practice when individuals are represented by counsel that they speak through counsel. I'm happy to put you back in a breakout room so you can talk to the lawyer about the things which you feel I should understand.
- MR. FETZER: Well, they're issues that I understand even better than my attorney, your Honor, and I have several key points to make, including the fact that the properties have --
- THE COURT: Hang on a second. Hang on. Ms.

- 1 Schank?
- MS. SCHANK: Yeah. Could we go in a breakout 2
- 3 room, your Honor?

answer.

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- 4 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Hang on.
- Okay. Let's take a little break here. 5
- 6 (Recess)
- 7 THE COURT: Ms. Schank?
- MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. We're ready to 8 9 pick up where we left off. But you may have to remind me if the Court was posing a question for me to directly 10 11

THE COURT: Well, I think we were having a general discussion about whether the argument you were tendering as to the ability to seize property with no value created a conundrum that if I agreed that it could be seized, whether I should give no value to your client. Now, I don't know whether you can argue effectively in the alternative or whether you have to make a concession choosing among two different strategies that are inconsistent with each other because -- because Mr. Pflum argues, at least with regard to the publication, there is a value and as a factual basis has suggested the royalties Dr. Fetzer earned prior to the Court's injunction.

Now, that's the factual basis the plaintiff

suggests. Is that overly generous because of the hiatus on the publication of the documents because of the pendency of the Court's injunction? Maybe so.

MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. I mean, I think in terms of findings of fact, perhaps that there could be a finding that -- you know, I'm trying to think of other proceedings related to executions and sales of property to satisfy judgment. Perhaps there's a finding of an estimated value, but then an additional finding that the debtor can assert exemptions and an additional finding that the property really has to, you know, under 815 it'll be sold by sheriff's sale was my understanding. So at that point, I guess then all the parties do know the actual value.

THE COURT: But you argue -- this isn't really a problem for me, Mr. Schank, because strategically, the defendant has argued the property has no value. So what possible reason would I entertain further proceedings to establish a value when the possessor of the property is testifying or presenting an argument that it has no value? Usually, it's the opposite. The debtor comes in and says, Judge, this is a million-dollar piece of property, and the creditor says it is not, we'll let the market determine by putting it on the market, which will establish value.

So I'm sure possibly the plaintiff will
stipulate as a factual matter that none of this property
has any monetary value. But I didn't give him the
opportunity to do that. I started right out by asking
Mr. Pflum what value they would offer in terms of what
amount they would offer in terms of the value of the
property.

What additional arguments you would like to

What additional arguments you would like to make on any of the three issues or areas that I demonstrated I needed to decide here today?

MS. SCHANK: Sure, your Honor. May I have one moment to look at my notes?

13 THE COURT: Okay.

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14 (Pause)

MS. SCHANK: Okay, your Honor. I'm ready.

16 THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. SCHANK: In addition to the argument and factual assertions made in Dr. Fetzer's affidavit and our supporting brief, I would like to just reiterate, and this goes from some statements made in the plaintiff's reply brief found on pages 8 through 10. They talk about wanting content from Dr. Fetzer's blog, I believe it was sort of in the alternative of if the Court finds domain names are not owned by Dr. Fetzer, and this goes to our overall argument as to this motion for turnover on what

the plaintiff's motive in making this motion is.

Based on the arguments the way I understand them, the plaintiff's argument is that each time Dr.

Fetzer puts content out to the world, whether that's on a blog or the internet or Facebook, then can the plaintiff file a motion for turnover, get control of that property and do as the plaintiff wishes, like deleting the property or just simply having control? And I don't think that is within the spirit of Wisconsin Collection Law. I don't think that that's -- I think it's contraindicative of Wisconsin statutes. And there's a big difference under the case law and what the law requires to a judgment creditor requiring a judgment debtor to turn over property versus turning over proceeds from that property. And we outlined that in our brief and cited some case law to that effect.

But I think this is creating a very slippery slope as to then what does a judgment debtor have to turn over because I want to emphasize the very big importance on this Court's order prohibiting certain statements that are contained in these books that the plaintiff requests to turn over. They can't be distributed. I can't imagine that the plaintiff would ever, you know, voluntarily allow the sale of these allegedly defamatory books.

So overall, I don't think that this motion is to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment. This motion has different motives. And regardless of what the findings of fact might be as to ownership and value and the legal question of can, you know, copyright rights be turned over, I think that this is a very, very thin line between what should a motion for turnover to satisfy a judgment in Wisconsin be used for.

THE COURT: Mr. Pflum, before your reply, Ms.

Schank, I don't know of any support in Wisconsin

Collections Law for the proposition that the court need concern itself with the creditor's motive. Can you cite any case or argument in support? I mean, maybe the motive is nefarious. The question is, is the property, is it subject to seizure or attachment, and what is it worth? Why would the motive be relevant? And if you believe it is, what is your authority?

MS. SCHANK: I believe it's just relevant from the -- from a policy perspective and legislative intent in writing Chapters 815 and 816. There are specific standards and procedures set forth in those statutes, and the intent of those statutes is to collect property from a judgment debtor to apply to a judgment. And I would argue that those statutes even just read literally show that that policy and legislative intent is to collect

- money for a judgment, not to have, you know, some other
  motive or even a nefarious motive, whatever the judgment
  creditor's motive is, that that's not in the spirit of
  Wisconsin Collection Law, your Honor.
- 5 THE COURT: Thank you.

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- 6 Mr. Pflum, it's your motion. You get the last 7 word.
- MR. PFLUM: I think Attorney Schank said -
  9 laid out our -- laid out how Wisconsin law, collection

  10 law, should work. Plaintiff has identified an interest

  11 in property that we think has value, and we are before

  12 the Court to apply that property to a judgment debt.
- Section 816.08 of Wisconsin law says the Court
  may apply any property to satisfy the judgment, and that
  is our motive here today.
  - Attorney Schank also addressed a part of the domain content. And if I may, your Honor, I'd like to have Attorney Zimmerman address that portion of her argument.
- THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Zimmerman.
- MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you, your Honor.
- 22 From an intellectual property perspective, when 23 an author creates an original work, a copyright arises as 24 a matter of law. That is an asset in this case of Dr. 25 Fetzer. Every time he posts something to his blog, a

copyright exists as a matter of law. We think that there's at least some value associated with those works and, therefore, we think it's appropriate to apply them to the debt, to the judgment in this case. And if Dr. Fetzer were to write a new book and offer it on the market and it had value, hypothetically, we think Mr. Pozner would have the right under Wisconsin law and under federal law to seek involuntary turnover of that property, as long as we can establish some value to offset the judgment.

And we're not here saying we think these things have pennies of value. We're here saying they have real dollar value and we're willing to offset a significant portion of the judgment in exchange for turnover of the property.

THE COURT: And I think as to the point Ms.

Schank was making about this hypothetical, well, what about what Mr. Fetzer does tomorrow? And I think,

Mr. Zimmerman, you're saying nothing we do or say here today with regard to the turnover of the property sought applies prospectively in this hypothetical creation of intellectual property at a later date.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, your Honor. That's exactly right. If Dr. Fetzer was in the furniture-making business, we're not asking for chairs that he hasn't made

- yet. But in the future, if he were to create a new thing
  that has value, my client has the right to attempt to
  take that property in exchange for an offset in the
- 5 THE COURT: All right.

amount of the judgment.

- MR. ZIMMERMAN: If Dr. Fetzer wins the lottery

  next year, we have a right to go after those assets,

  which are dollars and are intangible. Intellectual

  property is not different than that. We're looking at

  things that he has created and for which he has an

  existing copyright ownership.
- 12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Zimmerman.
- 13 Mr. Pflum, anything further?
- 14 MR. PFLUM: Nothing further, your Honor. Thank
- 15 you.

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- 16 THE COURT: All right. Since they
- double-teamed you, Ms. Schank, anything that you'd like
- to add in sur-reply?
- MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. I guess I would
- like to address then Dr. Fetzer's entitlement to a
- 21 statutory exemption. I don't think I was able to cover
- that. But under 815.18(3)(b), I'm not sure how this
- 23 would work given the sort of, in my mind, hypothetical
- \$25,000 value. But we do on the record assert
- 25 Dr. Fetzer's exemption, which would be in the amount of

1 \$15,000.

THE COURT: How is that consistent with your argument and your assertion the property has no value?

How do I -- how do I work all this sort of complicated iterations so that, Judge, first we want you to find there's no value 'cause we think that's a correct answer to the factual question?

MR. FETZER: Can the attorney and I have a separate moment to consult, your Honor?

THE COURT: Let me finish with my thought. And then to say, well, I want to argue in the alternative that now we say it has value and we want a \$15,000 exemption. But how would that work? Play it out for me. I mean, if we turn it over, since this is -- since this is not -- these assets are not actually something that apparently can be liquidated to cash. You know, I understand the exemption of taking the bank account or we're gonna seize the house or the car or the like. Just I want you to tell me how you think this would work first with regard to your factual assertion that it has no value, and then assuming it has a \$25,000 or \$100,000 value, what are you actually proposing?

MS. SCHANK: Sure, your Honor. What I'm actually proposing or the way I believe that procedurally the next steps would be if the Court does order the

turnover of certain property would be that then

statutorily, the plaintiff has to sell the property to

apply to the judgment. And at that point, then if there

is value, we'll know, and then Dr. Fetzer at that point

would -- that's when he would assert his exemption.

So I think there are some contingencies the way
I procedurally think that that process would go if the
Court orders turnover today.

THE COURT: Mr. Pflum?

MR. PFLUM: Your Honor, reviewing 815.18, we do not believe that exemption applies. It's for business property. Ms. Schank has not identified a specific piece of property in which to apply that \$15,000 exemption to. 815(3)(b) -- 815.18(3)(b) says it's business and farm property, equipment, inventory, farm products and professional books used in the business of the debtor.

Mr. -- as we argue, Mr. Fetzer created a copyright in books. I do not believe that -- we do not believe that that particular exemption would apply because he's not using these professional books in the ongoing -- in an ongoing business. And --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PFLUM: As to the other point, how this would apply, if they do identify a particular piece of property to offset the exemption, then I think it

speaks -- I think that what the Court, or how it would
apply this would be an \$85,000 reduction to the judgment
as opposed to a \$100,000 application.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, I agree. I was gonna
-- thank you, Mr. Pflum. I'm interrupting you.

Ms. Schank, so first of all, setting aside

Mr. Pflum's legal argument that it doesn't apply at all,

but even if it did, so here we're talking about things

that can't be published, but have, under your own

client's testimony, have no value. So are you suggesting

that then if I do turn it over, what you want me to order

the plaintiff to do is to have a sale, a sheriff's sale?

If nobody bids on it, it just cost your client \$100,000.

Is that what you want?

MS. SCHANK: Um, I can't speak to what I want, your Honor, but I think that if there's -- if the Court orders turnover, regardless of who wants what, I struggle, your Honor, with our hypothetical of talking about dollar amounts because I've never -- you know, typically in motions for turnover to satisfy judgment, it seems to me that rather than the plaintiff simply -- they still have to follow sale procedures and execution procedures under the statutes versus, you know, we have findings of fact and a court order on our motion for turnover, but then what is the guestion --

- THE COURT: There is a provision that allows
  the debtor and the creditor to stipulate as to value if
  there's no genuine dispute. I mean, this is a \$100,000
  question.
- 5 Now, I should actually say parenthetically, if Dr. Fetzer's point is it's worth \$125,000, I'll give you 6 7 an opportunity to go in a breakout room to talk about 8 this, but this right now is a \$100,000 question. And it 9 just seems to me a little odd and quite telling that the 10 debtor would take a position that a property that the creditor wants to value at \$100,000 has no value, and 11 12 just to prove Dr. Fetzer's point, if ordered turned over, 13 the creditor should sell the property or try to sell the 14 property at no value. So --
- MR. FETZER: May I consult with my attorney,
  your Honor?
- 17 THE COURT: Okay. I'll put you in a breakout room. Last breakout room, though.
- MS. SCHANK: Thank you, your Honor.
- MR. PFLUM: Thank you, your Honor.
- 21 (Recess)
- THE COURT: Welcome back.
- MS. SCHANK: Thank you, your Honor, for the -we appreciate your courtesy in giving us all these
  breaks. Just a couple quick comments.

We, after conferring -- after conferring with
my client, we're not willing to stipulate to any amount
of a value as to the property. And just two very brief
comments, and then I'll conclude my comments.

couple thoughts. Ms. Schank, is this a marital debt?

MS. SCHANK: No. I do not believe so, your

Honor. The judgment was against Dr. Fetzer only, and it
was, I believe, a tort claim related to the defamation
claims, and his spouse was never implicated. I'd ask
that Attorney Pflum confirm that, but that's --

THE COURT? Because this isn't -- I mean, a

THE COURT: I was there. I know what it was.

But I'm not so sure -- I do a lot of family law, and I'm

not sure it's clear. And I wonder what Mrs. Fetzer

thinks about leaving \$100,000 on the table, so to speak.

So I just want to let you know before you finish your

thoughts of refusal to concede value, you should be

prepared then for me finding accepting the factual

assertion by the debtor, that I will accept the assertion

that the property has no value. And if I make that

finding of fact, then there's no need to sell the

property on the market.

But even if I didn't do that to you, Ms.

Schank -- and I will confess, I'm at the outer edges of my understanding of collections law, but there are I

- believe in the statutes alternative ways of valuing the
  asset that is being seized. You don't have to sell
  everything on the sheriff's sale. You can set the value
  through an appraisal. Correct?
- 5 MS. SCHANK: I think that's correct, your 6 Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So who better to

appraise the value of this asset than your own client

who's telling me under oath it's not worth anything?

So if we went the value route, I don't know why we'd even have a contested case if the debtor's position is it has no value. But even if I assume Dr. Fetzer's factual assertion, I mean, are you saying that you think a -- I mean, this is Mr. Pflum's point. So we get someone to appraise the intellectual property who's knowledgeable in training, and they'll say to a reasonable degree of certainty given the circumstances of the property, it's not worth anything. Well, then you've answered the question. There's no setoff against the property if it has no value.

But let's say that the guy says it's worth \$100,000. The only thing you've accomplished is then the debt is reduced by \$85,000. The judgment still stands.

I'm just not sure how this --

MR. FETZER: Your Honor, just to clarify the

1 point --

2.1

- THE COURT: Mr. Fetzer --
- 3 MS. SCHANK: Jim --

4 MR. FETZER: -- there is no value as long as it 5 cannot be marketed. If the book could be marketed, it

6 would have value.

THE COURT: The record will reflect that I've muted Dr. Fetzer. It's not any disrespect to you,
Dr. Fetzer, but the judge is supposed to maintain the control and order in a court proceeding, and that includes the longstanding principle that persons represented by counsel speak through counsel. And I know Ms. Schank would like to speak on your behalf and has not yielded her legal responsibility to her client.

I mean, I understand, Ms. Schank, but I just think that perhaps for the sake of argument, the debtor has lost the perspective of the long-term goal of removing the Fetzers from beneath this mounting debt.

All right. I'll address that. Mr. Pflum, I guess -- I guess if in fact -- I think Ms. Schank probably makes the point, look at, I think you could argue that your valuation of the asset of \$100,000 is grossly inflated. So if the plaintiff, if the debtor demand is refusing to acknowledge or accept that as to a stipulated, then I think what they're saying is the value

should be determined by the processes set forth in the statutes. I think she's right on that. It doesn't mean that you don't turn the property over. It means that the creditor needs to make objective the valuation of the property.

If Dr. Fetzer wants to find an expert that says it's worth a million dollars, well, we'll see. I guess it's something I should hear. I don't know how he's gonna find someone given his own statement that it's not of any monetary value. The law -- the court order prohibiting Dr. Fetzer from continuing or repeating his defamatory statements is not gonna go away or be changed, so that aspect of the property's value is static.

So Mr. Pflum, I mean, I guess don't you think
Ms. Schank is right, they can demand an independent
valuation even though a reasonable person would think
it's gonna be far less than the offer made by the
plaintiff -- excuse me -- made by, yeah, the plaintiff?

MR. PFLUM: Yes, your Honor. I agree that under 815.18(7), the value of any property subject to an exemption shall be determined by agreement of the parties, which we do not have, or a commercially reasonable manner. And if your Honor isn't inclined to have an appraisal, we -- you know, I believe that Attorney Schank has mentioned this as well, that if a

receiver needs to be appointed in order to apply this, apply the copyright to the -- to satisfy the judgment through a sale, we would -- we can certainly file a motion.

2.1

THE COURT: We don't have to go that far because I think the creditor retains the power to decide what the creditor wants to do with the seized property. The creditor might say, look at, I mean, if I was -- if this was an agricultural case, the debtor would say, listen, I want my tractor back, it's my collateral and I want you to take it to satisfy the judgment, and I don't want to sell it. I want to use it to plow the fields.

So I'm not asking the plaintiff to make a decision today over what commercially reasonable way the plaintiff wants to set the value because it's very likely that the plaintiff does not want to put this particular -- these particular assets back into the market for continued use by anybody else. What I know about the case, I would think that would be the situation that Mr. Pozner is buying an asset, the source of what frustration he's had over the many years in continuing and forming the basis in the underlying defamation case. So I don't know that it's gonna go that direction, and I don't know that I need a receiver.

If Ms. Schank wants to challenge the valuation

offered by the creditor, I think she has that right. And if the appraisal comes out as Dr. Fetzer seems to suggest, it's worth nothing, then Mr. Pozner will still have the asset, but the setoff will be zero, or a dollar, a nominal value.

But I think, Ms. Schank, I assume you've talked, even though I said it was the last one, I assume that this is a risk that your client wants to take because of his rejection of the proposed valuation by stipulation.

MS. SCHANK: It is -- it is a decision that we have discussed, and there are -- that's not the only reason, your Honor. But, you know, there are other reasons we still feel that there's a procedure set in place to seize and sell assets.

THE COURT: Let's use the statute. I think, Mr. Pflum, it's not to seizure or to sell. That's not what collections is. It's for seizure and to assess value in a commercially reasonable manner.

I mean, you're not suggesting that every creditor always is required to sell an asset because that's the only commercially reasonable way to establish its value. There are other ways because the statute recognizes that by using those terms. Do you disagree, Ms. Schank?

MS. SCHANK: I may disagree, your Honor, but I want to take a look at the statute before I disagree. If you'll give me one second, please.

4 (Pause)

2.1

MS. SCHANK: So the point that I disagree with a little bit, your Honor, is that under 815.29, that talks about -- I mean, the language of the statute talks about sale after seizure of property to apply to a judgment. I'm trying to think of collection situations that I think I've seen, and I think I've seen a fair amount of them, where a judgment creditor is just able to hold on to property with I guess arguably adding on disputed value.

I'm trying to picture how this would actually work.

THE COURT: I would envision -- look, there's no question a debtor is entitled to a setoff for the reasonable valuation of the property seized. I agree with you completely. I do not agree that the only method of determining its reasonable value is to sell it. In fact, that might be the worst way to sell intellectual property. I mean, this isn't a house or a car. A debtor might say the property, that the market for the property is not conducive to a sale on the Dane County Courthouse steps and that the proper way of giving the credit to the

debtor would be an alternative valuation by persons
knowledgeable over the value of intellectual property.

2.1

So I think, though, if that is --and I don't believe that's a unilateral decision that can be made by the creditor alone, that if the debtor challenges the valuation, I mean, I think either party essentially could ask the Court absent an agreement to make that judicial determination which for intellectual property might be fairer to both parties.

All right. Thank you very much. I do conclude after careful consideration of the written material and I think in consideration of the arguments made by counsel I will go ahead and grant the motion. I believe I can answer the questions that I posed at the outset of this hearing as follows.

This is property that can be seized by the creditor, and I do agree with the legal arguments, the cases and analysis set forth in the plaintiff's brief and reply brief on that question which I adopt and incorporate in my oral decision from the bench on that issue.

I'm gonna do a favor. I believe that -- I believe that the plaintiff has made an offer for a valuation for the property far in excess of what I think based on Dr. Fetzer's position is its worth. I do think

that if the debtor continues to maintain the position that it is worth some other value, I don't know why anyone would want further litigation to say something is worth less than what the creditors, but I guess Dr. Fetzer has that right to say it's some valuation different. I do think that a commercially reasonable manner is an alternative other than a sale, and I don't think under the circumstances considering the equities and the position of the parties that it's appropriate to appoint a receiver. I didn't even get into who's gonna pay for the receiver, but the expenditure and additional financial resources in this case at this time under these circumstances do not warrant it.

days to state its position with regard to the valuation of the property that's seized. If the debtor asserts that the valuation is anything different than the offered amount, then you are to write the Court. And 30 days thereafter, Mr. Pflum, if you can draft an order for my signature, 30 days after making a statement that is -- I think 10 days to make a decision as to valuation. If you say we disagree with the valuation, then 30 days thereafter -- no, I should say 60 days thereafter, the debtor should submit to the Court an evidentiary basis, namely, an appraisal by an expert, as to what the debtor

believes the property is worth. That appraisal for the debtor's suggestion as to the valuation of the property then will be considered by the Court.

2.1

Mr. Pflum, if the plaintiff wants to submit its own appraisal for the valuation, it should do that 60 days thereafter. Upon receiving both appraisals for the valuation, the Court will either issue a written decision or schedule it on for further oral proceedings.

Finally, as to the issue of ownership or not,

I'm satisfied that there is a factual basis to support

the plaintiff's assertion that Dr. Fetzer has some

ownership interest in all the assets that are seized of

some kind and to some degree.

So to the extent that Dr. Fetzer's affidavit is directly inconsistent with his prior sworn testimony, I will strike those provisions under the Wisconsin sham affidavit rule.

Dr. Fetzer, the sham affidavit rule says a dispensable procedure within the discretion of the Court to say the best evidence of a person's factual knowledge is at the deposition taken available for cross examination. A subsequently prepared affidavit that's inconsistent with the oral answers made under oath at a deposition are not to be considered by the Court. And in those circumstances, I believe there is a factual basis

for the plaintiff's assertion of not only ownership of the property, but the nature and degree of what interest may exist.

So essentially, I view this as a creditor essentially getting a quitclaim from the debtor, understanding the debtor may take the position anecdotally that this isn't his property. That's the creditor's problem. And nothing I say or do as acknowledged by Mr. Pflum should suggest that my decision affects other persons or entities having an ownership interest in the seized property, only that Leonard Pozner now stands in the shoes of Dr. James Fetzer and that Leonard Pozner possesses all the rights, title and interest in the property to whatever degree they exist that were formerly possessed by Dr. Fetzer.

If we need to have a separate hearing on the valuation, I'll schedule a separate hearing because I do believe Dr. Fetzer is entitled to an accurate setoff of the value of this property. And as I indicated, I choose to accept the commercially reasonable method to determine the value of the property by expert testimony and written appraisals.

Mr. Pflum, or I should say Ms. Schank, have I missed any issue? Have I not addressed every argument that you've raised?

I should say parenthetically I quess we can deal with the setoff issue after if we have a hearing on the valuation of the property. I know, I will acknowledge the plaintiff's position that the setoff does not apply as a matter of law. But there's no sense in me, Mr. Pflum, making a call on that if we're going to have another hearing over valuation. The plaintiff retains its ability to argue that the setoff doesn't apply as a matter of law.

Alternatively, once we've determined value by appraisal, I can make a decision in the alternative even if it did apply what the setoff would be.

Ms. Schank, have I addressed all the issues and arguments that you intended to present here this morning?

MS. SCHANK: Yes, your Honor. If I could comment on one thing, one aspect of your ruling, if I may.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. SCHANK: There was a reference, you struck

-- the Court struck some paragraphs from Dr. Fetzer's

affidavit given his prior supplemental examination

testimony. And I just wanted to clarify that that

supplemental examination was taken in March of 2020 and,

you know, some of the testimony simply just changed as to

ownership. Specifically, what I'm talking about is the

- domain names are -- evidence and exhibits attached to

  Dr. Fetzer's affidavit show that the domain names'

  actually ownership lapsed in between 2020 and now. So I

  just wanted to put that on the record.
- 5 THE COURT: Well, thank you. And I think that 6 point may deserve some elaboration.

The truth be told, Ms. Schank, even if I -- I did read the affidavit of Dr. Fetzer. Even if I accepted it and didn't do anything about it, it wouldn't change my legal conclusions and my conclusions made here today. I pointed it out only in that I did not want to give credence to a further argument that when faced with inconsistent evidentiary testimony, a statement made during a deposition or a statement made in a subsequent affidavit, where inconsistent, the prior recorded testimony during the deposition will prevail under the sham affidavit rule. If in fact they're not inconsistent because of the passage of time, then the point that I'm making may not apply.

- MS. SCHANK: Thank, your Honor.
- 21 THE COURT: Mr. Pflum, anything further from 22 you?
- MR. PFLUM: Your Honor, just to clarify the dates, the motion is granted --
- THE COURT: -- effective immediately.

- 1 MR. PFLUM: -- effective immediately. Dr.
- 2 Fetzer has 20 days to submit a valuation.
- 3 THE COURT: No. He has -- let's say this. He
- 4 has 10 days to tell me in writing whether he accepts the
- 5 plaintiff's valuation of the property now owned by
- 6 Leonard Pozner. If he says I do not accept it and I
- 7 choose to employ the Court's alternative commercially
- 8 reasonable manner of valuing the property, then 60 days
- 9 thereafter, or 70 days from today, he's to submit expert
- testimony in the form of an appraisal. The plaintiff
- 11 then gets 60 days thereafter to make a decision what the
- 12 plaintiff wants to do.
- I mean, if I accept the appraisal, whatever it
- is, then you don't need to do anything. But if I
- disagree, then Mr. Pozner will submit his own appraisal,
- 16 I will look at that and then make a decision on further
- 17 scheduling thereafter.
- MR. PFLUM: Thank you, your Honor.
- 19 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Pflum?
- MR. PFLUM: No, your Honor. Thank you.
- 21 THE COURT: Thank you very much.
- Mr. Zimmerman, anything further from you?
- MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, your Honor. Thank you.
- THE COURT: Thank you very much, ladies and
- 25 gentlemen. Appreciate you calling in. Have a good rest

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of the day. We're adjourned.
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                    MR. PFLUM: Thank you, your Honor. You as
 2
          well.
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     STATE OF WISCONSIN )
                            ss:
     COUNTY OF DANE
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               I, ANN M. ALBERT, Court Reporter, do hereby certify
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     that I reported in stenographic machine shorthand the hearing
10
     held in the above-entitled matter before the Honorable FRANK
     D. REMINGTON, on the 24th day of June, 2022, and that the
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12
     foregoing is an accurate and complete transcript of my
13
     shorthand notes and the whole thereof.
14
               Dated this 7th day of July, 2022.
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                               Electronically signed by:
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                              Ann M. Albert
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                               Court Reporter
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